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“[T]he traditional concept of participation in a higher order
is not so subtly transposed into a deism in which God
supplies the material but man supplies the concrete norms.”
Russell Hittinger, The First Grace
“The pain and the shock are at most a warning and a symptom.
The real objection is that if man chooses to treat himself as raw
material, raw material he will be: not raw material to be
manipulated, as he fondly imagined, by himself, but by
mere appetite, that is, mere Nature, in the person of his
de-humanizing Conditioners. We have been trying, like Lear,
to have it both ways: to lay down our human prerogative and yet
at the same time to retain it. It is impossible. Either we are
rational spirit obliged for ever to obey the absolute values of the
Tao, or else we are mere nature to be kneaded and cut into new
shapes for the pleasures of masters who must, by hypothesis, have
no motive but their own ‘natural’ impulses. Only the Tao provides
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a common human law of action which can over-arch rulers
and ruled alike.”
C.S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man
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INTRODUCTION
My topic is the place of “higher law” in the ordinary practice of
law, and what I shall argue is, first, that it is to be encouraged, including
sometimes as a direct judicial contribution, in ways and to an extent that
can be roughly delimited; and, second, that it ordinarily amounts – or
should amount—to a less flashy affair than is sometimes supposed.
Taking the side of higher—or natural—law today makes for strange
bedfellows and odd crossovers between liberals and conservatives, but, as
I shall argue, a recovery of the genuine higher law tradition is what those
who care about human rights need above all else. And who can afford not
to care about human rights? Or imagine that they amount to nothing more
than transitory artifacts of our practical agenda?
At first blush, it would seem that conservatives, usually regarded
as the faithful (if benighted) transmitters of the fruits of the central western
tradition of reflection on the human situation, would be higher law’s
natural allies. Conservatives do like to regard themselves as the bearers of
intellectual gifts from the past. In recent years, however, many
conservatives have distanced themselves from the higher law, at least as
something with which the exercisers of judicial power should concern
themselves. Fearful that direct judicial access to natural law will operate
as a license for “activism” at the price of democratically enacted statutes
and the plain meaning of the Constitution, conservatives have sought to
deny judges much or any opportunity directly to speak the natural law.1
1

See, e.g., Walter Berns, Judicial Review and the Rights and Laws of Nature, 1982
SUP. CT. REV. 44, 77 (1983). See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA: POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990).
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Wary about allowing entry to centuries of theorizing about the contents of
higher law when it will matter most, at the moment of judgment,
conservatives have remitted the natural law task to legislatures. An
optimistic frame of mind, one might think.
But not entirely: conservatives have been able to count on others to
do the heavy—or is it light?—lifting. Over the last half-century or so,
liberals have been the eager advocates of a higher law approach to
judging—at least up until an historical point, to which we shall return.
Though they have shied away from the language of “higher law” or
“natural law,”2 liberals are the ones who have time and again convinced
the Supreme Court (and the lower courts) to look beyond the text of the
Constitution to recognize “rights” (that are conferred by higher law). The
right of privacy recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut, despite Justice
Douglas’s unconvincing attempt to find it “in penumbras, formed by
emanations”3 of the Constitution’s written terms, would be a leading
example of higher law’s making its way into positive law through the
judicial office. “We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of
Rights . . . , ”4 wrote Justice Douglas in Griswold. Seven years later, in
Eisenstadt v. Baird, Justice Brennan explained for the Court that the right
of privacy that Justice Douglas thought “inhered in the marital
relationship” was in fact, upon further reflection, “the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child.”5 And with this, the stage was set for
Roe v. Wade a year later. Paradoxical as it may seem to some, in recent
American history liberals have been the greater heirs to the higher law
tradition, and they have not allowed the inheritance to languish in the idle
hands of pork-barrel politicians.6

2

“Invocation of natural law seems to have passed out of fashion among leaders of
the movement for the extension of human right. One might have expected the opposite.”
R.H. Helmholz, Natural Law and Human Rights in English Law: From Bracton to
Blackstone, 3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1 (2005).
3

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).

4

Id. at 486.

5
6

Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).

See Russell Hittinger, Liberalism and the American Natural Law Tradition, 25
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 429, 496 (1990). Hittinger’s article, which was written in 1990,
was virtually prescient with respect to where the Supreme Court was taking the right to
privacy. His article has had a substantial influence on my thinking about many of the
issues that are discussed in this Article. In addition, CHARLES HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF
NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS: A STUDY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT AND OF THE
INTERPRETATION OF LIMITS ON LEGISLATURES WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE
DEVELOPMENT OF CERTAIN PHASES OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1958), though
no longer up to date, had a pervasive influence on my thinking about the role of natural
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And there is, I believe, much to be admired in liberals’ stewardship
of the higher law tradition and some of the fruits to which it has given
birth. To stick with the example at hand, a constitutional regime that did
not recognize a married couple’s right to privacy in the marital bedroom
would be, in my judgment, gravely deficient. But what then of the charge
that said right was recognized through an exercise of judicial “activism”?
The answer, I think, is nicely encapsulated in what Justice Harlan said,
concurring in the judgment in Griswold:
[J]udicial self-restraint will not . . . be brought about in the
‘due process’ area [except] by continual insistence upon
respect for the teachings of history, solid recognition of the
basic values that underlie our society, and wise
appreciation of the great roles that the doctrines of
federalism and separation of powers have played in
establishing and preserving American freedoms.7
We can suppose that “values” was how people—even very
tradition-minded people—talked about higher law in the 1960s, and the
point is that Justice Harlan appreciated that, in our judicial system, judges
have almost always understood themselves as having some, certainly
limited, opportunity directly to speak the natural law. It has been a
question of degree, not kind.8 It could have been otherwise, but that is
how it has been. “Activism,” it turns out, is on the side of creating a
fiction according to which judges in our system cannot sometimes directly
speak the natural law; the activists are those who cover over an attested
and widely accepted, if controverted, practice.
The tradition’s openness to natural law at the point of judicial
decision has never been, until the other day, a channel for arbitrariness. In
ways that will be elaborated below, it was characteristic of the long
tradition of theorizing about values—nee natural law and natural rights—
to recognize that every decision about what someone has a concrete
“right” to entails the careful resolution of trade-offs; one person’s right is
another person’s duty; claims to speak must be balanced against claims to
be let alone; and so forth. It was further understood that knowledge of
natural law and natural rights, the knowledge about how to do the

law in our legal tradition. Haines’s book remains indispensable on the place of natural
law in English and American law over the period it covers.
7

Griswold, 381 U.S. at 499 (Harlan J., concurring). The alternative means of
judicial “self-restraint” under consideration was the historically unattested test proposed
by Justices Black and Stewart, to wit, full “incorporation.”
8

The evidence is overwhelming. See HAINES, supra note 6, passim. One must
note, however, that reliance on or reference to natural law and natural rights does not
entail a judicial power to invalidate or replace legislative enactments. See MORTON J.
HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870–1960 156–59 (1992). The
question is much more nuanced and historically contingent. See infra at Section IX.
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balancing and delimiting, is itself drawn from plural sources that mutually
reinforce and limit one another.9
Recently, however, at the level of American constitutional
decision-making (with derivative consequences for the functioning of the
rest of our legal system), the long tradition of careful adjudication of
higher law principles came to a screeching halt; that “historical point,”
mentioned above, was reached; the commitment to nuanced
discriminations accumulated over centuries has been largely repudiated.
As it turns out, conservatives were right to worry, though perhaps for the
wrong reasons. The age-old tradition of incremental articulation by the
judiciary of a host of natural rights that are to be balanced and
harmonized, so as to be protected in law, has been supplanted by the
reduction to one right.
It happened almost at a stroke. Though it has yet to work its way
completely into the fabric of American law, the landmark judicial
assertion, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, of a right “to define one’s own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life”10 necessarily represents an end to the effort to discover, in
order to give legal effect to, rights that belong to humans in virtue of the
natural law. We need not wait for the Court to tell us that, in a world of
self-definition, there is no point in trying to discover other inherent rights
and the concrete conditions in which they can be realized. Taken for all it
is worth, a right to self-definition is limited only by human resources for
self-destruction. The Court asserted in Casey that “[o]ur obligation is to
define the liberty of all, not to mandate our moral code,”11 but a moment’s
reflection will confirm that this amounts to the sheerest sophistry. The
dilemma the Court sets up is false. In truth, to say what liberties people or
groups will have—or will not have—just is to make moral judgments.
I shall return to this all-important point below. My present concern
is the practical one that a stand-alone right to self-definition suffers from
the fatal flaw that it defies legal implementation, in ways that I shall
elaborate. The unadministrability of this juridically generated doctrine is,
I would submit, a sufficient reason to oppose it. To this extent, then, I
would join the conservative pushback against the self-defeating
jurisprudence of self-definition. However, one thinks of the baby in the
bath water. The widespread, reactionary rejection by conservatives of a
place for (genuine) higher law in judging should be resisted. As I shall
argue, a working legal system that is not porous, at the point of judicial
decision, to considerations of natural law and natural rights is morally
9

For one example, see Hittinger, supra note 6, at 498 (discussing Justice
Frankfurter’s approach to natural law reasoning).
10

See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851
(1992).
11

Id. at 850.
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untenable, at least in the medium run. Exactly how porous it must be, is a
question of prudence, not of a Platonic Form.
My thesis, then, is that, pace both liberals and conservatives, what
is needful today is a recovery of the higher law tradition that liberals
nourished until recently and that conservatives, long its champion, have
been anathematizing in their contrapuntal campaign against “activism”12
and the announced right to self-definition.
“Despite the fact that the Constitution does not explicitly
mention either natural law or natural rights, there can be no
doubt that Americans expect the law to recognize and
uphold natural rights. The interpretation and reform of law
according to natural principles of justice represents a
recurrent pattern in the history of American legal
culture.”13
In order to re-develop today a working sense of the proper place of higher
law in the quotidian practice of law, it is necessary to start by grasping the
ways in which natural law, along with the natural rights that derive from
it, should drive not only constitutional law, where it is perhaps most
conspicuous, but all that we do as we go about trying, through a working
legal system, to secure what is good for humans and to avoid what is bad
for them.
Caricature must be avoided. “Natural law is a multifarious concept
that defies simple analysis,”14 but on any reasonable analysis of it, natural
law is not an “and now for something totally different” affair. Nor is it
accessible by turning the mind’s eye in the direction of a cosmic codex, “a
sort of ghostly Internal Revenue Code in all of its magnificent detail
written in the heavens.”15 Natural law and the natural rights that derive
from it, I shall argue, are all about what is concretely good for humans and
their communities, and goods are discovered through trial and error
conducted and measured by practical reason. A legal regime that places
humans where they belong and delivers what is good for them, will do so
by giving effect to the natural law and the natural rights that derive from
it.

12

In their comparative study of English and American law, P.S. Atiyah and Robert
S. Summers have called attention to the origins and persistence of Americans’
expectation that law have content-oriented criteria of validity (not just source- or
pedigree-based criteria), including natural law and natural rights. FORM AND SUBSTANCE
IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL REASONING, LEGAL
THEORY, AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 3, 238 (1987). See also HAINES, supra note 6, at
309–52.
13

Hittinger, Liberalism, supra note 6, at 438.

14

Hittinger, Liberalism, supra note 6, at 429.

15

STEVEN SMITH, LAW’S QUANDARY 47 (2004).
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Part I introduces the topic of higher law and the judicial role by
summarizing aspects of a recent, much-discussed encounter between
Justice Antonin Scalia and Professor Steven Smith. Part II begins my
argument in favor of (delimited) judicial access to higher law by pointing
out some ways in which the legal positivist’s account fails at the level of
description. Part III goes on to describe the non-positivist approach to
judging that made the “common law” what it was (and could be again?):
fined and refined reason. Part IV zeroes in on how the common law
expectation of reasonableness resiliently reappears in an age of statutes
and administrative law, pace Justice Scalia. Parts V and VI sketch an
account of why, pace Smith and many others, a commitment to “reason” is
not necessarily a sell-out or an evasion; properly conceived, a commitment
to human practical reason turns out to be a commitment to truly legal
governance. Parts VII, VIII, and IX move from the terrain of common law
and administrative law into the realm of constitutional law and
fundamental rights in order to ask what a commitment to practical reason,
natural law, and natural rights will look like at this “higher” level. The
Court’s 2003 decision in Lawrence v. Texas provides the focus for asking
how fundamental rights fare, as a matter of law, when what the law
guarantees is a right to self-definition. In the Conclusion, I round out the
discussion of judicial access to natural law and natural rights; the focus is
on the sources of the parameters of judicial access to higher law. The
potential jurisprudential significance of sex toys, the one element in my
title that will seem not like the others, crops up throughout the Article.
Caveat lector. As will be unmistakable by now, this paper
represents one contribution to a larger project of attempting to revive a
perspective in jurisprudence that is associated with the Christian tradition.
The effort will seem to many misplaced, for, as philosopher and social
theorist Charles Taylor has recently shown in splendid detail, we live in an
age when an exclusive humanism is the presumptive position, and those
who would pursue a different course have to swim against the tide all the
way.16 The presumption today is that law can function as an exclusively
humanistic enterprise; indeed, there is a concerted effort to demonstrate as
much and seal up the conversation in one direction.17 But with increasing
frequency, one encounters efforts to make the necessary

16
17

CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE 19–21, 26–28, 98–99, 242–69 (2007).

See, e.g., BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE (2007). Brian
Tamanaha, another influential voice in the current conversation, though not (to my
knowledge) committed to a Christian perspective in law, is concerned not to let law be
hijacked by ideological forces, and is willing to acknowledge that “belief” may be
necessary. See BRIAN Z. TAMANANHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END (2006). On the latter
point, see Marc O. DeGirolami, Faith in the Rule of Law, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 573,
600–05 (2008). Another aspect of Tamanaha’s work is discussed infra text at notes 169
and 170.
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counterargument.18 The effort to recover a natural law perspective in a
post-Christian world is the work of Christians and others who will insist
that theirs are voices at the collective table as well;19 natural law and
natural rights are not now, nor have they ever been, the monopoly of
Christians. Steven Smith (whose work will figure prominently in this
Article) may well be right that it is utterly unlikely “that any full-bodied
version of natural law will flourish in the contemporary American
jurisprudential environment soon,”20 but, given the resilience of natural
law discourse over time, the argument on behalf of the natural law does
not amount to whistling in the dark. Natural law and natural rights may be
down, but in the course of American legal history, they’ve never been all
the way out – so much so that it is legal positivism’s comparative success
that needs explaining.21
In the marketplace of ideas, the traditional
position remains a voice to be heard. And that position is that it is not so
much that human positive law needs to be made moral (though it surely
does), but that positive law is not authoritative if it does not proceed from
an order of law that precedes human invention.
I. A QUANDARY IN LAW?
A recent—and really quite remarkable—encounter between Justice
Antonin Scalia of the United States Supreme Court and Steven Smith will
serve to introduce the questions I wish to explore. That encounter takes
the form of a review by Justice Scalia of Professor Smith’s muchdiscussed book Law’s Quandary, published in 2004.22 Accordingly, I
begin with a brief statement of Smith’s thesis (which I shall elaborate
later) and then turn to what Justice Scalia had to say about it. In short
order, something spectacular from the vantage point of contemporary
jurisprudence will be on display.

18

The recently-deceased dean of American “law and religion” studies, Harold
Berman, recounts that when, roughly two generations ago, he first began to work in the
area of law and religion (his earlier work was on Russian law), his colleagues at Harvard
Law simply ignored that part of his work. See his foreword to MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL
ET AL., CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT (2001).
19

The Jewish case for natural law is made by Rabbi David Novak in NATURAL LAW
(1998).

IN JUDAISM
20

Steven D. Smith, De-Moralized: Glucksberg in the Malaise, 106 MICH. L. REV.
1571, 1591 (2008).
21
22

See ATIYAH and SUMMERS, supra note 12, at 239.

Symposium volumes dedicated to consideration of Law’s Quandary were
published by two law reviews. The SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW volume 44 (2007) included
contributions by Steven Smith, Joseph Vining, Brian Bix, Patrick McKinley Brennan,
and Lawrence Solum. The CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW volume 55 (2006)
included contributions by Steven Smith, William Wagner, Justice Antonin Scalia, Joseph
Vining, Lloyd Weinreb, and Patrick McKinley Brennan.
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It is Smith’s contention that much of what those engaged in the
practice of law say and do requires, on pain of incoherence, that there be
more than many people would be willing to affirm as a matter of common
sense. Everybody has a working sense of what exists; everybody has, as
Smith puts it, an everyday ontological inventory.23 Mountains are on
everybody’s everyday ontological inventory; unicorns are on (almost)
nobody’s. Smith’s iconoclastic observation is that the ontology implicated
by ordinary statements of law exceeds most people’s workaday inventory.
In other words, what law’s practitioners say or imply is “real” in law does
not appear on the list of things most people regard, explicitly or implicitly,
as solidly part of the furniture of the universe. Ominously, it may require
more.
To pick one of Smith’s examples, many or perhaps most judges—
and the smart lawyers arguing before them—continue to act as if
statements of law are evidence of the law, not the law itself. It is Smith’s
observation that practitioners of law still presuppose the existence of what
used to be called “higher law,” of which statements of law are so many
pieces of evidence. Roughly a century after Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., infamously dismissed the “brooding omnipresence in the
sky,”24 thinking that he was doing as much for posterity, it appears that
practitioners of law are still saying about legal materials that they do not
as such constitute the law. To take a noteworthy instance that is roughly
contemporaneous with Smith’s book, in Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme
Court of the United States used its power of judicial review to strike down
a statute that criminalized consensual homosexual sodomy, and in doing
so, the Court stated that its decision just seventeen years earlier in Bowers
v. Hardwick, 25 which had refused to strike down a similar statute, was
“not correct when it was decided.”26
But by what standard, we are led to ask, was Bowers adjudged “not
correct?” It is concessum that the text of the U.S. Constitution says
nothing, in terms, about a right to engage in such conduct.27 Is it the case,
then, that Bowers was adjudged “not correct”—not just, say, unpopular or
unseemly—by a non-legal standard? Surely it would be, at best, anomalous (in the etymological sense of the word) for laws to be adjudged
unlawful on non-legal grounds.28 But if, then, Bowers was wrong as a

23

SMITH, LAW’S QUANDARY, supra note 15, at 8–11.

24

Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).

25

478 U.S. 186 (1986).

26

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).

27

I say “such conduct” because, for reasons that appear below, it is not at all clear
exactly what right Lawrence recognizes. See infra note 118.
28

This is the common (though not the only possible) view. See, e.g., “It follows –
since a legal decision can only be wrong if it is contrary to law – that the law must be
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matter of law, what is—what is the ontological status of—the law that
precedes both the Constitution and what the courts authoritatively say and
decide? Is it what much of the Western tradition, descending from both
Athens and Jerusalem, has referred to as the “natural law”? Is it of divine
provenance? If it is not, then how did it get to be higher? And so forth.
It is no part of Smith’s project in Law’s Quandary to give such
questions definitive answers. Clever lawyer that he is, Smith is content to
rest his case with the observation that, if he is right about the recurrent
evidence that the way we persist in practicing law—notwithstanding
Justice Holmes and his so-called Legal Realist successors—presupposes
the existence of a higher law, we are stuck living in the “quandary” that
gives his book its title.29 The alleged quandary is that while the regnant
jurisprudence goes on denying the existence (and a fortiori the relevance)
of any higher law, practitioners of law—judges, lawyers, and citizens—go
on acting as if there exists a law that precedes the statements of law that
abound, such that, for example, Bowers could be “not correct” as a matter
of higher law, not just of opinion, taste, or judicial self-assertion.
Justice Scalia, for his part, is not convinced that Smith has met the
burden of proof, and in reply the Justice argues in the alternative. First,
Justice Scalia combs Smith’s plentiful evidence and finds in it less of a
commitment to “higher law” than Smith finds there.30 Second, Justice
Scalia argues that if one is practicing law the way one ought to practice
law, there is no risk of a quandary.31 The way we ought to practice law,
according to Justice Scalia, is as textualists. Textualism, of course, is the
judicial philosophy that Justice Scalia has famously championed for a
generation now, the strictures of which are that judges are called upon
simply to give legal texts the meaning that they would have had to an
ordinary person at the time of their enactment.32 What textualism requires
appears on every sensible person’s everyday ontological inventory;
nothing more exotic than texts and ordinary meanings are required; no
quandary looms.
Third, not willing to leave things there, Scalia goes on goodnaturedly to chide Smith for not coming right out and saying that God is

something higher than any decision.” SIR JOHN BAKER, THE LAW’S TWO BODIES 5
(Oxford Univ. Press 2001). See also BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL
SCIENCE 29–30 (Columbia Univ. Press 1928).
29

SMITH, QUANDARY, supra note 15, at 176–79.

30

Antonin Scalia, Review of Steven D. Smith’s Law’s Quandary, 55 CATH. U. L.
REV. 687, 688–90 (2006).
31
32

Id. at 689–90.

For the now-classic statement of his position, see ANTONIN SCALIA, “CommonLaw Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in
Interpreting the Constitution and Laws,” in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3–48 (1997).
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necessary if the practice of law is (as Smith suggests that most of us
believe) not simply a matter of giving legal texts their ordinary meanings.
Here is how Justice Scalia’s review of Law’s Quandary ends:
As one reaches the end of the book, after reading [Professor
Joseph] Vining’s just-short-of-theological imaginings
followed by Smith’s acknowledgment of “richer realities
and greater powers in the universe,” he . . . is sorely
tempted to leap up and cry out, “Say it, man! Say it! Say
the G-word! G-G-G-G-God!” Surely even academics can
accept, as a hypothetical author, a hypothetical God!
Textualists, being content with a “modest” judicial role, do
not have to call in the almighty to eliminate their
philosophical confusion. But Smith may be right that a
more ambitious judicial approach demands what might be
called a deus ex hypothesi.33
Justice Scalia’s positive thesis can be summarized as follows. On
the one hand, a “modest” judicial role is satisfied by the rudiments of
textualism, nothing more extravagant being required on the ontological
inventory. On the other hand, a more ambitious judicial role would
require the involvement of God. Perhaps the Almighty’s role would be as
the promulgator of a “higher law”—something not on the everyday
ontological inventory?
There will be more to say about the details of the Smith-Scalia
disagreement, but first the elephant in the room, the spectacle I alluded to
at the outset of this Section. Mainstream jurisprudence, from Holmes to
his contemporary off-the-rack imitators, largely ignores the possibility that
something or someone “higher” plays some part in what we do in law, and
when it does not ignore the higher possibility, it usually does so in order to
dismiss or even ridicule it. Steven Smith, however, has thrown the higher
possibility into bold relief. The Smith-Scalia exchange has done
contemporary jurisprudence the favor of returning important questions
closer to academic respectability. Many will mock both them and their
pursuers, but the elephant remains resolutely in the room.
Smith, though, having placed the elephant, leaves things there,
suggesting that while our current “[p]erplexity is not a resting place,”34 we
can at the moment do no more than “to confess our confusion and to
acknowledge that there are richer realities and greater powers in the
universe than our meager modern philosophies have dreamed of.”35 As
Smith sees things, we are stuck in the aforementioned quandary.
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But are we? As mentioned, Justice Scalia responds by suggesting
that a legal system equipped with an abstemious judicial role can get by
without God or anything more than texts, but he also goes further coyly to
speculate that Smith’s own reticence just might be programmatic:
Hmmm. Richer realities and greater powers than our
modern philosophies have dreamed of. Could there be a
subversive subtext here? . . . Could it be . . . that Smith is
inviting, tempting, seducing his fellow academics to
consider the theological way out of the quandary – the way
that seemed to work for the classical school?36
By the time the Smith-Scalia tete-a-tete is over, academic protocol has
been violated (by the mere mention of God), but neither Smith nor Scalia
has made the philosophico-theological case that practicing law does entail
something that involves God or higher law. In fact, Scalia-the-textualist
even denies it – though perhaps, as with Smith, for programmatic reasons.
II. POSITIVE LAW, EVIDENCE OF BELIEF, AND NATURAL LAW
In puzzling out the relationship between higher law and the
quotidian practice of law, we can start by noticing the single most
important statement in analytic jurisprudence about what the law is. The
statement is by John Austin, and its importance is a function of its
combined influence and falsity. According to Austin, law is the command
of the sovereign backed by the threat of punishment.37 Period. This is one
manifestation of the jurisprudential stance known as positivism, the view
that what is the law is such solely in virtue of its pedigree, viz., that it has
been posited – put in place – by the sovereign of a state. Justice Louis
Brandeis continued in this vein when, in the landmark case Erie v.
Tomkins, he quoted Justice Holmes as follows: “law in the sense in which
courts speak of it today does not exist without some definite authority
behind it . . . . The authority and only authority is the State . . .”38 The
negative pregnant of the Holmes-Brandeis thesis is that only what the state
declares to be law is law, and it is law regardless of its content. One
commentator captured the thesis as follows: “there can be no legal right
which is not recognized or created by the sovereign power of the state.”39
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But this line of theorizing takes things too easily, I think—more
easily than the practioners of law actually take things. Even Holmes
observed that Austin knew too little English law.40 Our legal practice
defies the simplification according to which law is exactly a sovereign’s
commands. What gives us law that can be obeyed is not identical with the
sovereign decrees and the Austinian positivist sees. There is more to the
springs of law than sovereign commands. What we do in law “takes place
in a field of pain and death”41 (as the famous phrase of the late Robert
Cover has it), and, with exceptions that prove the rule, we strive to get it as
right as we are able because of what it, including (but not exclusively) its
force, means to us and to our common and individual possibilities. In a
word, the estimable achievement that is our legal system owes its
greatness to a history of craftsmen committed to criticizing, according to
some standard that is not an evanescent artifact of our creation, what has
been laid down, in order to improve it. What gives us law is a process that
itself is governed by a higher law, even if we do not call it that —
although, as I shall explain, I think there are important reasons both to call
it that and to have reason to mean it.
The simplifiers and excluders, the soft positivists and the hard
positivists are all of them voices in the conversation, to be sure, and they
have their points. Law to live by does need to be stable so as to be
knowable and reliable.42 However, the simplifiers and excluders arrive on
the scene when what we do in law is already more layered than they would
allow. In the words of Professor Joseph Vining, whose work Smith
explores: “[L]aw is evidence of belief far stronger than academic
statement and introspection can provide.”43 And that evidence is that,
whatever the normative point of the legal positivist, to which we shall
return, the practitioners of law, with exceptions that prove the rule, find
ways of making the law what it should be. As Vining says, “[l]egislation
is the arbitrary that we allow – but also limit. To make the point in its
strongest form, it could be said that legislation is lawless behavior, except
that by a paradoxical trick we make legislative statutes materials we use in
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determining what the law is.”44 Although destined to be imperfect in its
results, the quest to bring a higher law to bear in the ordinary practice of
law is conspicuous for its intransigence.
In articulating the relationship between higher law and the law we
create, it is easy to get too high too fast. It is even a fair question whether
“higher law,” the term I have favored so far (because of its currency owing
to its place in the title of the famous study by Edward Corwin), is
inevitably too misleading to be serviceable. “Higher” may connote
inaccessibility or, even more extreme, otherness. Corwin himself
considered the higher law position “quaint.”45 The near-ubiquity of
Holmes’s “brooding omnipresence” caricature makes it nearly impossible
to recall that most of the traditional partisans of “higher law” had in mind
nothing of the sort Holmes dismissed.46
A similar sinkhole of confusion lurks near this kindred term
“natural law.” For example, “law of nature” was historically often used as
a synonym for natural law. To the modern ear, however, laws of nature
denote the deliverances of Newtonian physics, not an ordinance of reason
that humans can freely follow or flout.47 Likewise, the expression “natural
law” is sometimes understood to denote the theory according to which
nature herself “legislates” for us. But in that case, then, natural law would
be lower rather than higher, a mere biologism. And there is the related
fact, further, that even among those theorists whose natural law bona fides
cannot be questioned, from Thomas Aquinas in thirteenth century to John
Finnis in the twenty-first, there is considerable disagreement about how to
define the natural law. For Aquinas, it is truly law; for Finnis, it is law
only in an analogous sense.48
For reasons to which I shall come in due course, I regard the issue
of definition as exceedingly important, but I also believe that one can go a
very long way without getting it altogether settled. In a jurisprudential
world in which the legal positivist dominates, almost—though not quite—
all non-positivist positions can usefully be grouped under a “natural law”
umbrella. What those under the umbrella have in common is the judgment
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that posited legal materials do not exhaust the legal universe; in other
words, what we have produced, and what we do, in law remain permeable
to objective moral evaluation. For example, the statute that is palpably
unjust may or must in certain circumstances be denied effect; likewise, the
rights articulated in a written constitution do not necessarily exhaust
people’s fundamental rights in law, such that it is at least possible that
Bowers was “not correct” when it was decided.
But what cannot be grouped under the capacious natural law
umbrella are all those moral theories that boil down to variations on the
theme of self-projection or emotivism. The natural law tradition has as a
core plank that there exists a moral order not of our own creation, and
those who regard morality as something to be created ex nihilo, either
individually or collectively, necessarily cannot abide that claim.
Therefore, postponing the question of the correct definition of natural law
for the moment, I would suggest the following working definition or
placeholder: “Natural law is an order that: (1) reason does not make, in
the sense that it is not an artifact of our practical agenda; (2) is
presupposed by legal and moral deliberation, and is brought to light by
theory and reflection; and (3) is in some way normative for conduct and
for our legal artifacts.”49
III. TRADITION AND REASON IN THE LAW
What, then, has been the relationship between natural law thus
understood and the practice of law? First the canard, because it has had
wide purchase. Sir William Blackstone famously taught that the law of
England was the custom of the realm from time immemorial, and
adjudication was a process of oracular law-finding and declaration.50
Blackstone’s image of the judge as a ventriloquist has enjoyed lots of play,
and was especially appealing to those late-nineteenth century common law
judges who wanted little credit for innovating at a rate that would keep up
with the breakneck speed of the Industrial Revolution and its collateral
social consequences.51
Blackstone’s portrayal of the judicial role, however, was
inadequate, first, to what English judges actually did and, second, to how
they understood what they were doing. The genius of the common law
was not that Englishmen in time immemorial already had everything all
figured out, such that all of us who came later could live by their perfect
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rules set out in an exhaustive set of precedents. Writing more than a
century before Blackstone, Lord Coke said it best: “Reason is the life of
the law; nay, the common law itselfe is nothing else but reason.”52
Crucially, what Coke meant by reason, as he proceeded to explain, was
not the achievement of a single individual, but the temporally extended
achievement of a group: the “artificial perfection of reason, gotten by long
study, observation and experience, . . . fined and refined over centuries by
generations of grave and learned men. . . .”53 Not just because of
Blackstone, but in all kinds of ways, through all manner of fictions, and in
varying degrees, judges in the common law tradition have masked
themselves and covered over their creativity.
Though they seem rarely and perhaps admirably to have called
attention to the fact, the judges of England were part of a practice of
creative but bounded innovation.54 The process has been analogized to
playing a game of Scrabble.55 There are some things you can do and some
you cannot, the options change as things go forward, and there is a
premium on cleverness. Whereas Blackstone had judges ventriloquizing
for a mythical past, the common law judge as understood by Coke is a
contributor to a dynamic tradition, what philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre
has described as a “historically extended, and socially embodied”56
process which sets the conditions for its own continuous growth and
development.
Tradition here is not the process of recapitulating the past, but
rather, as Mary Ann Glendon has explained, the crucible of creativity in
which the current generation can add a layer of intelligence to what has
been handed down, thus meeting the challenge of a world that has never
before existed.57 As Justice Scalia acknowledges, siding with Coke
against Blackstone,
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from an early time – as early as the Year Books, which
record English judicial decisions from the end of the
thirteenth century to the beginning of sixteenth – any
equivalence between custom and common law had ceased
to exist . . . The issues coming before the courts involved,
more and more, refined questions to which customary
practice provided no answer. . . . 58
Over and over one finds the students of the common law
commending it for being a great system of reason.59 Indeed, as legal
historian A.W. Brian Simpson has explained, “[i]n the common law
system no very clear distinction exists between saying that a particular
solution to a problem is in accordance with the law, and saying that it is
the rational, or fair, or just solution.”60 J.N. Figgis puts the point
succinctly: “Common Law is the perfect ideal law; for it is natural reason
developed and expounded by the collective wisdom of many
generations.”61 Likewise Charles Fried: “When we say of a judge or
lawyer that he is learned in the law, we assume that there is a body of
knowledge to be learned in, and that such learning increases wisdom,
judgment, and justice.”62
In the long history of the common law, there have been periods of
greater and lesser fertility, creativity, and success in developing natural
reason so as to achieve the fair, just, or right solutions. The American
legal theorist Karl Llewellyn described the peculiar greatness of
America’s early common law judges in these terms:
The tone and mark consist in an as-of-courseness in the
constant questing for better and best law to guide the
future, but the better and best law is to be built on and out
of what the past can offer; the quest consists in a constant
reexamination and reworking of a heritage, that the heritage
may yield not only solidity but comfort for the new day and
for the morrow.
It is a way of on-going renovation of doctrine, but touch
with the past is too close, the mood is too craft-conscious,
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the need for the clean line is too great, for the renovation to
smell of revolution or, indeed, of campaigning reform. 63
And it was precisely these qualities that led Justice Scalia himself
to concede that the common law method “has proven to be a good method
of developing the law in many fields – and perhaps the very best
method.”64
IV. LEGAL LESSONS FROM ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
This high praise from Justice Scalia, though, came as a concession
in the context of a sustained argument against the continued use of that
very method today in the U.S. Justice Scalia’s stated objection to the
common law method stems from several related sources, which come
down to this: democracy. All that the common law judges achieved
“would be an unqualified good,” says Justice Scalia, “were it not for a
trend in government that has developed in recent centuries, called
democracy.”65 Justice Scalia continues: “[T]he Mr. Fix-it mentality of the
common-law judge”66 is inconsistent with the demands of democracy.
But surely this is not necessarily the case. It is perfectly competent
to the people, is it not, for them to decide that they wish to have judges
adding, as I have said, a layer of intelligence to what has been handed
down? If this is what the demos wants, then why should “democracy”
stand in the way of it? I understand that sometimes judges do otherwise
than what they have been charged to do, but that would be a separate
problem – not an argument from democracy simpliciter.
Whatever the verdict on this question, however, it is overshadowed
by the undeniable fact that by now, the people, through their elected
representatives, have enacted vast bodies of statute law, rafts of positive
law that were unknown in the period in which the common law judge was
at his stride. These enactments supplant the wide fields of legal territory
once cultivated by the common law judges in their creative but careful
way. We live in an age of statute law.
But even statutes are not self-interpreting. The question then
arises: What are judges to do not with precedents but with statutes? Guido
Calabresi famously suggested that we need a common law for the age of
statutes, a common law approach to statute law.67 Other suggestions have

63

KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 36 (1960) (discussed by
Glendon, Knowledge Makes a Noisy Entrance, supra note 57, at 130).
64

SCALIA, Common-Law Courts, supra note 32, at 12.

65

Id. at 9.

66

Id. at 14.

67

GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).

THE PLACE OF “HIGHER LAW”

19

included “dynamic statutory interpretation.”68 Justice Scalia’s response to
these and cognate suggestions, of course, is textualism. With the possible
exception of scrivener’s errors, the textualist judge just goes ahead and
implements the legislature’s will as expressed in the statute as understood
by an ordinary hearer at the time of enactment (though stopping short, for
example, of giving effect to scrivener’s errors)69—so long, of course, as it
is “constitutional,” a judgment the nature of which we are coming to.
So far, then, the picture is one of judges removing their commonlaw wigs and donning their statutory-interpretation visors. This picture is
staggeringly misleading, however, because it leaves nearly everything out.
Yes, we live in an age of statute law, but, correlatively, we also live in an
administrative state. Most statutes are made to be given effect by
administrative agencies.
Today, nearly all authoritative guides to primary conduct, which if
necessary will be given coercive effect in court and then with the help of
the sheriff, are of administrative origin: the rules and orders made by
administrative agencies pursuant to statutes that create the agencies and
give them their specific regulatory tasks to perform. However, and this is
the rub: although agencies do indeed create rules and decide adjudications,
their doing so does not, as such, assure those outputs will carry the force of
law. 70 No, administrative outputs are subject to a complex web of
potential forms of judicial review under a wide range of statutorily
prescribed and judicially fashioned standards. And judicial review of
administration, I want to suggest, is where the common law’s virtually
inexorable insistence on “fined and refined” reasonableness reenters
through the side door. We can recall here Joseph Vining’s observation
that “legislation is the arbitrary that we allow—but also limit.”71
To take a concrete example, the statute setting forth the standards
according to which courts review administrative action, section 706 of the
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, provides that the “court shall . . .
hold unlawful and set aside agency action . . . found to be . . . arbitrary,
capricious.” There are historically interesting reasons why the statute
sought by its terms to set the reasonableness bar so very low (“arbitrary,
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capricious”),72 but one should not be deceived by the mere words of the
statute. As Vining suggested, what we do in law is far more powerful
evidence of belief than is what we say. When confronted with “the
argument that the arbitrary and capricious standard,” as it is called,
mandates only that an agency exercise the minimum
rationality required of a legislature by the due process
clause [of the U. S. Constitution], the Court replied, “We
do not view as equivalent the presumption of
constitutionality afforded legislation drafted by Congress
and the presumption of regularity afforded an agency in
fulfilling its statutory mandate.” Rather, the Court held, an
agency must articulate a “satisfactory” explanation for its
actions that does not “run[] counter to the evidence before
the agency” and that demonstrates a “rational connection
between the facts found and the choice made.”73
The case from which the commentator quotes is one of the small
number of Supreme Court decisions that vie to define judicial review of
administrative outputs in the U.S. today.74
To be sure, there is no end of to’ing and fro’ing on precisely how
demanding courts should be when reviewing agency action. There is no
end of effort to chop the onion ever finer, and sometimes one hears stark
claims that courts should back off and let agencies pretty much do what
they will. And, to be sure, one sometimes finds courts imposing their own
will to the exclusion of agencies’ reasoned results. But Justice Felix
Frankfurter caught the thrust of the expectation of the American legal
system when he said that “[r]eviewing courts must be influenced by a
feeling that they are not to abdicate the conventional judicial function,”
and that in adopting a “phraseology” governing review Congress
“express[es] a mood,”75 not something mechanical. And what stands out
about the mood as appropriated by the U.S. courts is, I think, the pervasive
insistence that reason prevail, and this by “the conventional judicial
function” of adding a layer of intelligence to what has been handed
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down.76 One of the great American administrative law scholars of the last
generation put the matter this way:
I have suggested that normally the courts should tolerate
agency law making which does not in the courts’ opinion
seem clearly contrary to the statutory purposes as the courts
understand them. But the statute under which an agency
operates is not the whole law applicable to its operation.
An agency is not an island entire of itself. It is one of the
many rooms in the magnificent mansion of the law. The
very subordination of the agency to judicial jurisdiction is
intended to proclaim the premise that each agency is to be
brought into harmony with the totality of the law; the law
as it is found in the statute at hand, the statute book at large,
the principles and conceptions of the “common law,” and
the ultimate guarantees associated with the Constitution.77
This is artfully said, right up to and including at the end: not the
ultimate guarantees given by the Constitution, but those “associated” with
it. There are guarantees that precede and bid to control written, positive
law in its myriad and diverse phases and forms, a point to which we shall
return.
I said above that when discussing the bearing of higher law on the
practice of law, it is easy to get too high too fast. What I have just been
describing – bread-and-butter judicial review of routine administrative
activity—may strike some as irrelevant to my announced topic “higher
law.” Both proponents and opponents of higher or natural law sometimes
suppose that a working legal system that respects the natural law will, in a
blaze of cosmic glory, authorize Solomonic judges to speak the natural or
higher law directly, without benefit of any preceding positive law sources
or restrictions. But, with qualifications to be added in due course, quite
the opposite is the case. Higher law receives its due only if it works its
way into the particulars, and it rarely reaches the particulars without a lot
of wind-up, revisions, corrections, and recalibrations. Workaday judicial
review for reasonableness is one, though by no means the only, example in
our legal system of (what I shall refer to as) higher law in its ordinary
mode, making a slow and labored entrance.
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V. DIALECTIC AND PRACTICAL REASON
Before turning to the question of higher law in (what I shall refer
to as) its extraordinary mode of entrance, we should pause and ask why
our legal system’s demand for reasonableness, which I have been tracing,
should count as a manifestation of “higher law” at work. Related to this
question is another: who in the world is opposed to reasonableness
anyway. In other words, have I set up an anti-reason straw man in order to
install a weak “higher law” that is nothing more than garden-variety
practical reason? To put a slightly different question: Does the inveterate
insistence upon reasonableness meet the test set out in the deliberately
broad-church placeholder definition I postulated at the outset?
There are several points that need to be made. First, the assault on
reason in the legal academy has been nothing short of riotous. It has taken
legion forms (from so-called Critical Legal Studies, which sees only
power, to legal pragmatism which recognizes only an instrumental role for
reason), but Holmes himself had pretty much said it all before. “You will
find some text writers telling you that law is a system of reason,”78 wrote
Holmes, but that, he went on to say, is sheer nonsense. According to
Holmes, law is (as Austin taught us) no more than the command of the
sovereign backed by the threat that the state will bring its arm to bear;
reasonableness is not a condition. As for “reason” as it was traditionally
understood, Holmes wrote: “I have no faith that reason is the last word of
the universe. I know nothing about it.”79 The only sort of reason Holmes
seems willing to admit is instrumental reason (e.g., if I want x, I better do
y to get it). Thus, “[r]eason working on experience does tell us, no doubt,
that if our wish to live continues, we can do it only on [certain] terms. But
that seems to me the whole of the matter.”80 And, for Holmes, “natural
law” turns out to be no more than the run of mankind’s “Can’t Helps,” that
is, those things we find our selves having to believe.81
Holmes’s rejection of non-instrumental reason was thoroughgoing
and, in its Nietzschean way, profound. There is also, though, an element
of silliness (which became more pronounced in his imitators) in the
rejection of the place of non-instrumental reason in the life of the law, and
it is important to spot the following point of entry. In the famous opening
lines of his book The Common Law, Holmes opined that “[t]he life of the
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law has not been logic: it has been experience.”82 The logic-or-experience
dilemma, however, is false.
On the one hand, it is true that, as the nineteenth century thundered
along, the judges who grew increasingly self-effacing gave their opinions
ever more of a logical form. Holmes knew what he was talking about
when he observed that “[t]he language of judicial decision is mainly the
language of logic. And,” as he went on to say, “the logical method and
form flatter that longing for certainty and for repose which is in every
human mind.”83 However, Holmes was not right that the alternative to
logic is brute experience. In the realm of human affairs, it is, rather,
reflection (upon experience) leading to judgment, or, in the traditional
phrase, practical reason.
As the central tradition of moral philosophy understood until
recently, “‘[p]ractical reason’ is reasoning . . . about what to do.”84
Historically, it stood opposed to theoretical reasoning about what is.
Confidence in theoretical reason operating in the modes of science has
grown in inverse proportion to the moral philosophers’ confidence that,
when it comes to what to do, there is anything to “reason” about, except
perhaps instrumentally.
In the tradition of which the common lawyers and judges were a
part, however, it was the essential function of practical reason to be able to
identify goods, that is, acts worth performing and states of affairs worth
bringing into existence; e.g., learning is an act worth doing, self-mutilation
is not; a just and reliable system of food distribution is a state of affairs
worth bringing into existence, a system that reliably allows foods to spoil
or be stolen is not. Now, there is no gainsaying the varied nature of the
philosophical disputes about how all this works or does not work at the
level of epistemology, but this much is clear: the traditional view was that
there are goods, that we can know them, and what it is to know a good is
exactly to know that it should be done or pursued.
Furthermore, as Mary Ann Glendon has observed, “[t]he common
law method was never,” despite what the common-law judges (caricatured
by Holmes) typically said,
a system of deductive and inductive logic; nor was it mere
praxis unchastened by theory; nor was it just a system of
reasoning by analogy with the principles of choice more or
less up for grabs. Lawyers do, to be sure, employ all of
those forms of reasoning, but the mode of analysis that is
the hallmark of the Anglo-American common-law tradition
is one that dates back to antiquity – dialectical reasoning.
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Glendon continues:
Dialectical reasoning, which came into disrepute among
philosophers starting with Descartes, begins with
controversy – with premises that are doubtful or in dispute
– rather than with known or irrefutable givens. It does not
aim at certainty, but at determining which of opposing
opinions supported by strong arguments should be
accepted. That should not lead one to regard dialectical
reasoning as a mere form of rhetoric however (unless one is
prepared to understand rhetoric as more than the art of
persuasion). For dialectic at its best involves a “groping for
truth.” In the human sciences, we inch our way toward
such glimpses of truth as are available to us, using the
means of investigating facts, critical inquiry, dialogue,
disputation, and defense of one point of view against
another.85
Though we merely grope our way toward knowledge of what it
would be truly good for us to do, incrementalism is toto caelo apart from
indifferentism or skepticism.
The traditional view, then, despite the protestations of the legal
logicians, did not suppose that practical reason knew its objects with the
certainty associated with physics or mathematics. What is good, always is
particular. It may in general be good to restore things to their rightful
owners, but it would not be good to restore a borrowed axe to a nowinsane neighbor. What is good is learned to be such through trial and
error, and the experiments take place in the laboratory of life, where things
are messy and precision is not always possible. As Aristotle taught, one
should not seek in an area more precision than it allows. “Practical reason
is a leaky vessel,” but, as Glendon has observed, “it’s the one we’ve
got.”86
The thesis, then, is this: beneath and generative of the probabilistic
premises of the common law is practical reason working in its dialectical
mode. We inch our way toward “glimpses of truth” about how we ought
to order our conduct, including through law, to realize goods. To return to
my placeholder definition, the common law insistence upon
reasonableness presupposes “an order that: (1) reason does not make, in
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the sense that it is not an artifact of our practical agenda; (2) is
presupposed by legal and moral deliberation, and is brought to light by
theory and reflection; and (3) is in some way normative for conduct and
for our legal artifacts.”87
VI. NATURAL LAW AS REAL LAW
Now, before moving on, I want to pause to anticipate several
possible objections or questions, which in turn will provide a bridge to
considering natural law in its extraordinary mode of entrance. The first
concerns the relationship between practical reason and “the law” we
practice; the second concerns practical reason’s relationship to natural or
higher law.
In tackling the first issue, we can return to Steven Smith’s Law’s
Quandary. One aspect of the story he tells about the quandary today
concerns what people do when, first, they discover that law is not the selfcontained geometry that some sometimes claimed that it was, but then,
second, refuse to follow Holmes and the Legal Realists to the extravagant
claim that “law” is simply a cover for the strategic, organized expression
and wielding of power by another name. As Smith explains, one popular
strategy for meeting this challenge has been “law and” – the move to
supplement or correct the inherited legal materials with the insights of
other disciplines. Candidates for this role have included economics,
policy, philosophy, or even, “practical reason.”88 In the end, Smith rejects
the “law and practical reason” strategy, and, for reasons to which I now
turn, I think he is both right and wrong to do so.
As I have already suggested, individuals turning to precedents,
statutes, and other sources in order to come to judgment on what the law is
on a particular point just are looking for distilled practical wisdom, that is,
they are reasoning about what to do in light of, though not exclusively in
view of, what has been handed down for the community’s authoritative
guidance. If we were to describe this with the help of Venn diagrams, I
would say, with two qualifications to be introduced in due course, that
what we have is not practical reason supplementing law, but, rather, law
itself as a subset of practical reasoning. Law is that subset of practical
reasoning that is either promulgated to the community or generated by the
community itself for itself, and potentially given coercive effect by him or
them who have care of the community, for the common good of that
community.
The first qualification would be that, obviously, sometimes people
engaged in practical reasoning in law, as elsewhere, draw on the products
of theoretical reasoning, as when a bureaucrat at the Environmental
Protection Agency relies on scientific data when drafting a rule regarding
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treatment of whitefish so as to reduce the risk of botulism.89 The rule is a
piece of practical reasoning for the good of the potential white-fish eating
community, and its quality is in part a function of whether the science
behind it is sound. Law was never bereft of the learning of theoretical
reason, otherwise it could not distinguish between, say, night and day, and
the difference between night and day makes a difference in terms of what
we should decide to do.
My reason for rejecting the “law and practical reasoning” strategy,
then, is that human/positive law already was or is a piece of practical
reasoning: there’s no “and” about it.
Smith’s principal reason for rejecting this strategy is different and
instructive. Smith concedes that practical reason is at work in law, but
suspects that what we do in law cannot adequately be accounted for as an
exercise in practical reason. Smith points to ways in which some of what
we do in law is ill-adapted for solving our practical problems. He points,
specifically, to the “practical inefficacy of law’s distinctive discourse.”90
To one scholar’s observation that precedents carry “a wealth of data for
decision-making” (what I have referred to as distilled practical wisdom),
for example, Smith replies that there are or might be better ways of
transmitting apt data for decision-making in law.91 But of course, the
imperfection of our methods of transmitting data through a temporally
extended dialectical conversation is not evidence that they not methods of
practical reasoning.
Another of Smith’s reasons for rejecting the thesis that what we do
in law can be adequately explained as practical reason in action is that
people use practical reason all the time, as “business executives,
arbitrators, school teachers and principals, coaches, [and] parents,” but in
no other field do we witness “the specific and extraordinary treatment of
precedent and text that is so conspicuous in legal discourse.”92 Smith is
certainly right that law’s methods are unique; but then, our purposes in
law are sui generis. Coaches, parents, business executives, whatever their
authority and responsibility within their respective spheres, have neither
the responsibility for the common good of all nor the coercive power of
the state behind them. The common good’s depending, as it does, on both
stable rules and the capacity for disciplined, creative adjustment goes a
long way in justifying the common law method. And again, the
imperfection of our legal methods hardly subtracts from their being, in
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fact, methods of practical reasoning.93 If our memories were better or our
legal communities small and simple enough, we might get along fine
without text and with only a limited universe of precedents committed to
memory.
Which brings me to the second objection I want to anticipate. I
would call it the weak broth objection, and it states simply that practical
reason, even if one grant all that I have said about it, does not rise to the
level of law, let alone of higher or natural law. This is an altogether
important objection, and my response is to admit the objection. But this is
not the end of the matter, because I have not yet given the adequate
explanation of practical reason that will bring out the element of higher
law in it. Practical reason is not its own measure.
To be sure, you will find many proponents of natural law theory,
such as John Finnis and those who follow his lead, maintaining that what
we traditionally refer to as the natural law is – and is less misleadingly
referred to as – practical reason, with its own non-legal first principles. As
I mentioned earlier, Professor Finnis is among those who regard the
“natural law” as law only in a qualified or analogical sense.94
The core of the central tradition descending from Thomas Aquinas,
however, took a quite different view of the matter, specifically that natural
law is law in the full sense of Aquinas’s definition of law, to wit, an
ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him or them who have
care of the community, and promulgated.95 And this is because the natural
law is in us as a participation in the eternal law, that is, the Divine Mind
providentially disposing all things to their natural and supernatural ends.
Mercifully, it is not my purpose here to give a full-dress account of
the metaphysics of the traditional Thomistic doctrine of natural law.96 My
goal is only to indicate how, in the traditional doctrine, the natural law is
truly law, and to indicate as much requires the introduction of a few
scholastic distinctions that will risk exhausting the contemporary reader’s
patience. Aquinas’s approach is unlike those that are current today. He
does not arrive at his definition of natural law “simply by examining the
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meaning of the concept of law”97 or baldly asserting—a la Austin—a
novel definition. Instead, Aquinas proceeds by attending to “what is
absolutely first in the order of being.”98
Doing so, Aquinas discovers the Divine Mind governing the entire
community of the universe. God rules irrational creatures solely by
moving them from potency to act, but his rational creatures he rules both
by sustaining the inclinations that move them toward their ends and – with
this we come to the natural law—impressing upon their minds precepts of
law.99 “By the impression of created light God induces the creature to
share in the rules and measures of the eternal law.”100 The decisive point
is this, that practical reason is not ab initio self-norming: the natural law
has been promulgated within the human practical reason, and it is man’s
share or participation in the eternal law.
The weak broth objection thus fails because human practical
reason is governed by a share in the Divine Mind itself. God almighty has
legislated in the human mind. The natural law is natural in terms of how it
is received and held in the human mind, but the natural law’s source and
pedigree are supernatural.
Furthermore, the precepts of the natural law track and govern our
given natures. As Aquinas explains, “the first precept of the natural law is
that good is to be done and pursued and evil avoided,” and, he continues,
Since . . . good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature
of a contrary, hence it is that all those things to which man
has a natural inclination, are naturally apprehended by
reason as being good, and consequently as objects of
pursuit, and their contraries as evil, and objects of
avoidance. Wherefore according to the order of natural
inclinations, is the order of the precepts of the natural
law.101
The natural law, then, is a species of divine law that is held
naturally in the human practical reason, and it legislates that humans are to
act according to their natures, that is, to do and pursue what is good for
them. When natural law is treated as a form of rationalism, without regard
to the fact that what is legislated is what is good for humans and their
communities, legalism is the result; when God the legislator is left out of
the picture of the natural law, there is no lawgiver and, therefore, no
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law.102 When, however, what God commands is what is by nature good
for the creature, such higher law is not “now for something totally
different.”
Again, this sketch is hardly a complete account or defense of the
traditional doctrine of natural law; indeed, it is only the most tendentious
summary. Still, it is sufficient to my present purpose, which is to explain
why a commitment to live according to the demands of practical
reasonableness might – just might – itself be a commitment to higher law,
whether we recognize it as such or not. If impressed upon practical reason
are precepts of divine law, living according to practical reason is not to be
self-norming but to be (so to speak) normed from above.
The second qualification I would add to my earlier argument that
law is a subset of—not an add-on to—practical reason relates to this:
practical reason can proceed to make law only by judging in conformity
with the natural law. The natural law never enters our human living ex
proprio vigore; it depends, for its entrance into human living, on the
exercise of practical reason and the antecedent free choice of the will to
follow the precepts of the natural law.103 Natural law in its ordinary mode
of entrance is just practical reason working itself out in our contingent
system of governance, subject to the demands of the natural law. And
this, believe it or not, is all part of the divine, providential governance of
the universe. To define the natural or higher law correctly is important,
above all, because it is God’s law.104
VII. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND OUR CONSTITUTION
I turn now from the ordinary mode of the natural law’s entrance, to
its extraordinary mode. I refer to constitutionalism, the project of creating,
possessing, and giving effect to the fundamental human law of a polity,
and here my focus will be on the uniquely American problematic of living
under the written Constitution that was ratified in 1789, and, specifically,
on the role of the courts in exercising “judicial review.” In mediating
among a written constitution, a duly enacted congressional statute, and
higher law, the courts, apart from the possibility of constitutional
amendment, have the last word on how, as a matter of human law, we are
going to live. To telegraph where I am going, I would say that when the
natural law enters in its extraordinary mode, it does so on a continuum
with the ordinary mode. That is to say, it is the work of practical reason,
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under natural law, functioning in an historically extended conversation.
After all, what tools other than practical reason and natural law and
tradition do we have for figuring out what to do and what not to do? And,
after all, constitutions are about what to do and what not to do.
From the Constitution’s being a product of practical reason,
however, it does not follow necessarily that the Constitution should be
treated in the same way as our other legal artifacts. It is obvious that there
exists a hierarchy among legal materials. As Chief Justice John Marshall
famously wrote, “We must never forget that it is a constitution we are
expounding.”105 But what are we to remember? Marshall’s own answer is
not the only one that has been offered.106 Paradoxically, a constitution that
is brought into being in order to allow the natural law to govern human
living, can itself become a barrier to natural law’s entry into the positive
laws. But this is to get ahead of things.
As everyone knows, the amended U.S. Constitution enumerates
certain rights, but these enumerated rights do not exhaust the rights that
the Constitution is understood to guarantee.107 As one learns in the
introductory course in constitutional law, the principal vehicle for
articulating, recognizing, vindicating, defining—it is hard to know the
correct gerund to name the phenomenon—of unenumerated
“fundamental” rights by the courts has long been known by the oxymoron
“substantive due process.” Once upon a time in American jurisprudence,
in the era now captured under the epithet “Lochnering,” the nontextual
fundamental rights sounded in terms of property and economic interests.108
Today, they include the rights to marry;109 to have children;110 to direct the
education and upbringing of one’s children;111 to marital privacy;112 to use
contraception;113 to bodily integrity;114 and to abortion.115 A lower federal
court recently found a fundamental right to use sex toys.116
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Plainly, this is a mixed bag, and some will gravitate more toward
some items in the bag than toward others. For present purposes, however,
I am going to stipulate that any constitution that did not recognize and
protect the liberties to maintain bodily integrity, to marry, to marital
privacy, to have children, and to direct the education and upbringing of
one’s children would be pro tanto untenable. Why? Such liberties are
necessary if human persons are to be free to meet the demands of the
natural law, that is, to pursue the goods commanded by the natural law and
the conditions necessary for their realization.
But there is more—or, rather, less—going on here than what I have
just said about the importance of protecting such liberties for the sake of
satisfying the demands of the natural law. The Court does not state its
claims as I have stated them; the Court does not indicate which liberties
should be protected and the natural law reasons for protecting those
liberties. Instead, with an exception that will shortly swallow the rule, the
Court talks in terms of fundamental rights. What we need to inquire into,
then, is what is the source – the ontological status—of such unenumerated
fundamental rights.
The Supreme Court set out to clarify the bases for the recognition
of a putative fundamental right in the 1997 case Washington v.
Glucksberg, in which the argument was pressed that the Court should
recognize the fundamental right of a mentally competent, terminally ill
adult to commit physician assisted suicide. “Our established method of
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substantive-due-process analysis,” the Court explained, “has two primary
features.” The Court continued:
First, we have regularly observed that the Due Process
Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and
liberties which are, objectively, “deeply rooted in this
Nation’s history and tradition,” . . . . and “implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty,” such that “neither liberty nor
justice would exist if they were sacrificed” . . . . Second,
we have required in substantive-due-process cases a
“careful description” of the asserted fundamental liberty
interest.117
Summing up, the Court stated: “Our nation’s history, legal
traditions, and practices thus provide the ‘crucial guideposts for
responsible decision-making,’ . . . that direct and restrain our exposition of
the Due Process Clause.”118 If a fundamental interest is at issue, a state
may not interfere with it “at all . . . unless the infringement is narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”119
Unsurprisingly, employing this test the Glucksberg Court
concluded that there exists no “fundamental right” to physician-assisted
suicide. On that point Glucksberg is still the law of the land.
However, a mere six years after Glucksberg, the Court decided
Lawrence, the case that asserted that Bowers was “not correct” when it
was decided, and it did so without so much as a mention of Glucksberg.
How could it, and still come to the same conclusion? Glucksberg called
for a “careful description” of the novel liberty being claimed, but in what
terms would one give a careful description of the right claimed in
Lawrence? An index of the difficulty of answering the question is the
following heading introducing the subsection that includes Bowers and
Lawrence in one of the leading American constitutional law casebooks:
WHAT SHALL WE CALL THIS SEGMENT – THE
RIGHT TO ENGAGE IN HOMOSEXUAL SODOMY?
ADULT, CONSENSUAL SEXUAL CONDUCT IN THE
HOME? THE AUTONOMY OF PRIVATE SEXUAL
CHOICES? SEXUAL EXPRESSION AND CONTROL
OF ONE’S BODY? UNCONVENTIONAL SEXUAL
LIFESTYLES? THE RIGHT TO CONTROL ONE’S
INTIMATE ASSOCIATIONS? THE RIGHT TO MAKE
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CHOICES ABOUT THE MOST INIMATE ASPECTS OF
ONE’S LIFE? THE RIGHT TO BE LET ALONE?120
Which among these is or are, in the form stated, “deeply rooted in
this Nation’s history and tradition,” let alone (because the test is
conjunctive, not disjunctive), “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”
such that “neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were
sacrificed?”121
In the end, Lawrence does not hold that any one of them is. The
Lawrence Court held unconstitutional a statute that made it a crime to
engage in “deviate sexual intercourse, namely anal sex, with a member of
the same sex (a man),” but it did so without saying whether it was doing
so, first, because there was a fundamental right at issue and the statute
could not withstand the called-for “strict scrutiny” or, second, because no
fundamental right was at stake and there was no rational basis for the
criminal statute. As Justice Scalia wrote in dissent, “the Court simply
describes petitioners’ conduct as ‘an exercise of their liberty’ – which it
undoubtedly is.”122
As would, equally undoubtedly, engaging in
“prostitution, adult incest, adultery, obscenity, child pornography,”123
bestiality, the torturing of (innocent) babies, same-sex marriage, and the
use or distribution of sex toys.
If we cannot imagine our constitutional regime’s recognizing a
fundamental right to all nine of these exercises of “liberty,” we have to ask
on what principled basis the refusal would be made. Especially in a
culture, such as our own, that expects “total justice”124 from law, the
question cannot be evaded.
VIII. NATURAL RIGHTS, NATURAL LAW, AND SELF-DEFINITION
To return, then, to the question about the source of the fundamental
rights that vie for judicial recognition as part of our fundamental positive
law, what I want to suggest is that Lawrence represents, like Casey (of
which it is, relevantly, merely an application), an end to an authentic
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jurisprudence of natural rights.125 Lawrence and Casey are not just wrong
in terms of their specific results: they are wrong inasmuch as they abandon
the project of identifying and giving legal effect to human rights. Some of
this was almost inevitable; some of it was purely willful.
What I mean by “almost inevitable” is that the attempt to identify
and spell out natural rights, as such, is an inherently incomplete enterprise.
Although international declarations of human rights appear with ever
greater frequency, the ontological status of human rights remains deeply
and widely contested. There are philosophers who defend the proposition
that humans have rights by nature, in the sense that individuals are by
nature endowed with metaphorical but metaphysically-secure swords and
shields in aid of their possessors’ progress and protection. These rights
are said to be possessions of individual human subjects as such, which is
why they are sometimes also known as “subjective” rights. These natural
human rights—individual or subjective—are said to be parts of the very
furniture of the universe.126 This is a not-uncommon view. But the better
view, it seems to me, is that of Alasdair MacIntyre:
[T]he truth is plain: there are no such [natural or human]
rights, and belief in them is one with belief in witches and
unicorns.
The best reason for asserting so bluntly that there are no
such rights is indeed of precisely the same type as the best
reason which we possess for asserting that there are no
witches and the best reason we possess for asserting that
there are no unicorns: every attempt to give good reasons
for believing that there are such rights has failed.127
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The reason that the attempt to identify and spell out natural rights
is, as I say, “an inherently incomplete enterprise,” is that there are no good
reasons to be believe that “natural rights” are part of the furniture of the
universe. Obviously, this point is contestable, but for present purposes I
simply assert it.128
I do so because, even if this is so, it does not necessarily follow
that we should give up (what I have referred to as) “the project of
identifying and giving legal effect to human rights.” This is because it
may be possible to derive natural rights from the natural law. Though (by
my stipulation for purposes of the present discussion) natural rights are not
part of the primordial furniture of the universe, it just may be that they are,
as I think, derivable from it. By derive I mean not only that natural rights
are not inconsistent with the natural law; not only that they can but need
not necessarily follow as conclusions from the natural law; but, rather, that
a doctrine of natural rights follows necessarily from the content of the
natural law. This is so, I think, because if I say, per the natural law, that
“it is not good for Brennan to be murdered,” it would seem to be
equivalent (at this level) to saying, “Brennan has a natural right not to be
murdered.” It is not right that Brennan be murdered.
In other words, “rights” are statements of the right/correct
relationships among human persons and their communities. Insofar as
natural rights describe such relationships between persons considered as
free moral agents, those relationships are both a product of and subject to
the whole of the natural law. Innocent persons have a right to life because
the natural law establishes that the taking of innocent human life is an evil
to be avoided, not a good to be done and pursued. The natural law
grounds rights; it also conditions them. One might say that rights are the
recipient’s view of the relations established by the natural law, and it may
be useful to speak about the natural law in the terms of the recipient’s
perspective, that is, in terms of natural rights.129
But even if this is true, still it is not the end of the matter. The
tradition of natural rights discourse stretching back several millennia
affirms that humans possess certain rights as a matter of higher law; these
are what the natural law requires. Though there have been disagreements

point simply that it does not follow from the fact that a statement cannot be demonstrated
that this is not true. Which is true, but could equally be used to defend claims about
unicorns and witches. Natural or human rights then are fictions . . . .” RONALD
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about what these rights are, there has been remarkably much agreement at
a high level of generality, such as life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of
happiness. On the other hand, however, the tradition of natural rights
discourse has not been content to rest at such a level of abstraction or
generality. Nor could it.
The reason for this is that no one lives – no one has her rights
vindicated or violated – in the abstract.130 So, for example, the right to
direct the upbringing and education of one’s children is limited by the
right of the state to protect the child’s right not to be abused. The
engagement of practical reason will come at the level of deciding, say,
when parental discipline crosses the line and becomes child abuse. If
justice is to be done, a judgment will be called for on this question, and
what we think natural law and natural rights require will be material to
reaching that judgment.131
Long is the historical list of those who have tried, at the level of
theory, to put meat on the bones of human rights. It includes Roman
jurists, a host of mediaeval philosophers and theologians and canonists,
the Spanish scholastics of the post-Reformation period (such as Francisco
Suarez, Robert Bellarmine, and Francisco Victoria), and in the early
modern period such names as Samuel Pufendorf, Hugo Grotius, Emer de
Vattel, Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui, Adam Smith, Francis Hutcheson, and
many more. And to this list one would need to add all the twentieth and
twenty-first century advocates of human rights, both individuals and
groups, such as the U.N.132 And to all these theorists, one would have to
add the names of all the judges who have labored, mostly in anonymity, to
make the natural law and natural rights effective where they matter most,
that is, in particular judgments.
By the time Lawrence is over, however, the Court has taken itself
(and its subjects) out of the millennia-long conversation, with all of its
sub-conversations, by which persons, groups, and their governments have
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discerned what rights humans have by nature, which among these should
be given effect by government through positive law, and in which
particular configurations. Lawrence works an evacuation, and in this it
was only an application of that truly revolutionary idea first advanced by
the Court in 1992 in Casey: “At the heart of liberty is the right to define
one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the
mystery of human life.”133 This is the exception that swallows the rule:
Self-definition supplants discovery of the moral order.
My immediate concern is not that this position is in error as a
matter of philosophy or theology, but that it leaves the jurist with too little
to work with. It is no wonder that Lawrence did not bother to try to claim
that there is a fundamental right, or even a right simpliciter, to anything in
particular. In a legal universe populated by self-defining people, there is
no tradition, of natural law and natural rights discourse, to look back to
with a view toward corroborating, extending, refining, or correcting it.
Nor is there any predicting what such self-defining folk are going to
demand next. “If what the Constitution protects is a general and abstract
right of making self-defining decisions, then the Court must commit itself
to the business of vindicating an indeterminate field of individual
rights.”134 The unworkable result is that
[t]hrough its judicial organ, government will always appear
either to be in arrears on the scope of liberty (always
catching up to latest revisions and concepts of free
selfhood), or to be arbitrary in the way it sets determinate
limits (the very purpose of which is to make power
predictable). . . [A]s to rights, the Court is caught in a
perpetual cycle of being over- and under-inclusive.135
To be adequate to the right, a legal regime would have to be clairvoyant.
Failing that, “plastic and revisable selves need a plastic and revisable
law.”136 As Russell Hittinger explains:
There may well be a kernel of moral truth in the Casey
dictum, but as it stands the “right” is under-specified. Until
it is further specified, no one can know who is bound to do
(or not do) what to whom. And so long as that condition
persists, there is no limit to the government. On the one
hand, we have a principle of unbounded individual liberty;
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on the other, a government responsible for enforcing that
principle in a very arbitrary manner.137
Unbounded government is a perverse and illusory vindicator of personal
liberty.
To look at this from another angle, up until Lawrence, those
seeking to challenge government regulation bore the burden of
demonstrating that their fundamental rights were being violated, in other
words, that government was (as I would put it) getting in the way of their
meeting the demands of the natural law. Under Lawrence, there would
now seem to be a “presumption of liberty,” with the result that, where
there is a plausible claim to an exercise of liberty, government must justify
the regulation.138 But, according to its own profession, the Court is
without resources to do so, because, as it said in Lawrence (quoting
Casey): “Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our
moral code.”
To be sure, this idea, of defining liberty without making moral
judgments, is incoherent and unworkable – and that is exactly the point
that needs making. It is not possible “to define the liberty of all” without
making judgments that are moral, that is, about what should or should not
be done. And this just is the perennial domain of practical reason and
natural law. In the same breath with which it claimed not to be reaching
moral judgments (“not to mandate our moral code”), the Lawrence Court
enacted sub silentio its preferred moral theory. No rational person can fail
to see that a vindication of liberty still requires distinguishing it from
license; the “liberty” to torture (innocent) children is not going to be
conferred as a matter of legal “right,” no matter how “essential” someone
may think it is to her self-definition. To take a recent example, in arguing
for “boundless respect” for individual conscience and consequent liberty,
Martha Nussbaum quickly adds: “this principle does not imply that all
religions and views of life must be (equally) respected by government. . . .
If people seek to torture children . . . citing their religion as their reason,
their claims must be resisted even though they be sincere.”139 In sum, “no
one will consent to have their freedom bound in the civil order by
someone else’s idiosyncracies.”140
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In distinguishing between liberty and license/idiosyncrasy, the
Court not only adopted the harm principle,141 but also preferred a
remarkably narrow definition of harm and causation.
In Lawrence . . . the Court in effect held, in agreement with
and at the urging of the libertarian Cato Institute, that the
Constitution . . . enact[s] John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty.
The result, if consistently followed, would be to presume
unconstitutional all laws limiting “liberty,” i.e.,
substantially all laws, and put on the states or national
government the burden of justifying them. As a corollary
of this philosophic position and illustrating its potential, the
Court explicitly rejected traditional standards of morality as
a means of meeting the government’s burden of
justification.142
One reason we (presumably) cannot imagine our constitutional
regime’s recognizing a fundamental right to all nine of the acts mentioned
above is that at least some of them violate the harm principle (which is
now the unwritten moral “law” of the land) as well as other moral
doctrines that now have been excluded from constitutional
jurisprudence.143 Instead of giving moral reasons, the Court pretends that
it flies above morality—but in the belly of the plane a theory of morality
that is inconsistent with natural law and natural rights is smuggled in. The
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harm principle is just as much a moral theory as the one developed by
Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics or the one developed by Immanuel
Kant in The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, only it is deeply
impoverished. “The absence of legislative power is established by the
right of the individual to be self-norming. . . . The individual . . . is under
neither a higher nor a lower law, but is a law unto himself.”144
As I said at the outset, taken for all it is worth, a right to selfdefinition is limited only by the human resources for self-destruction. But,
to borrow a familiar phrase from another context, the Constitution is not a
suicide pact. By focusing attention on the traditions of the American
people, Glucksberg had been an attempt to stave off this result, which had
been foreshadowed by Casey: The American moral tradition is not simply
Millian. But if, therefore, Glucksberg is to be commended for refusing to
allow the Court unilaterally to promote its own preferred moral theory (to
the exclusion of other strands in the tradition), we should notice that
Glucksberg is itself a symptom of our collective problem. The Glucksberg
opinion says nothing about the existence of natural law or the natural
rights that derive from it, nothing about what humans are and what is good
for them, nothing about anything with ontological punch.145 The
Glucksberg test is positivistic, in the sense that it takes our society’s given
morality as far as we can go for purposes of legal justification—there is, in
other words, no possibility of having a conversation about what is in fact
good for humans to do. Lawrence promptly made Glucksberg its prey146,
but Glucksberg had already rendered human rights prey to the contingency
of the past. Under Glucksberg, the source—and limit—of our rights is
what our history happens to give us.
But one would not want to press this criticism of Glucksberg too
far. For the reasons developed above,147 the opinion’s unwillingness to
call attention to the pre-historical, ontological status of rights was an
exercise in prudence; its refusal to leap to an imagined ahistorical meeting
with the objects of its inquiry was a piece of moral realism. We never
stand face to face with the natural law or natural rights in all their
resplendence; as I have argued, knowledge of the natural law and rights
enters historically, in the same history as the one in which we do our
deliberating and deciding. History and tradition, though not the last word,
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are our point of entry to knowledge of whatever is not historically
contingent. Though the tradition may stand in need of correction and
revision going forward, these will not be possible if we live every day, as
Descartes set out to do, as if it were our first. The dialectical argument
must go forward, the conversation must bring the past to bear in order to
face questions about the future in an informed way.
The question is how to discipline and guide inquiry when novel
questions of natural law and right are pressed, a question on which the
Glucksberg Court considered itself incompetent to offer any guidance. I
have suggested that the common law method of dialectical reason adding a
layer of intelligence is the ordinary road to giving temporal effect to
natural law and the natural rights that derive from it. “[A]judication under
the Due Process Clauses is like any other instance of judgment dependent
on common-law method, being more or less persuasive according to the
usual canons of critical discourse.”148 One cannot, I think, rule out a
priori that there will be moments when genius or prophetic intervention
will prompt conspicuous strides forward (or what appears to be forward),
but these will be the exception. Natural law and the derivative natural
rights are about what is good for individuals and their communities, and
the discoveries of goods are ordinarily the deliveries of temporally
extended discussions that can engage, as necessary, in a process of selfcorrection. “Natural or fundamental rights [are] not derived by a kind of
Cartesian reasoner who only consults his own mental geometry,”149 as
Justice Douglas demonstrated he understood in Griswold:
We deal with a right of privacy other than the Bill of
Rights: older than our political parties, older than our
school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or
for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of
being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of
life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a
bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is
an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our
prior decisions.150
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IX. SPEAKING THE NATURAL LAW
My argument has been that what we do in creating, sustaining, and
developing a legal system is, ought to be, and ought to be understood to be
the work of discovering and making effective, in our common and
individual living, the natural law and the natural rights that derive from it.
That work falls variously to citizens who elect legislatures, legislators who
draft and pass laws, administrators who implement such laws, and so
forth. And it will also fall to judges, those whose work has been my
principal focus in this Article, in various modes, including “common law”
judging, statutorily prescribed judicial review of administrative action,
and, most conspicuous, the judicial recognition of unenumerated human
rights in the exercise of constitutional judicial review.
But in arguing that the judicial office should be both created to be
and understood to be a contributor to the project of making the natural law
effective in our living, I do not invite a free-for-all. For government to be
subject to the natural law alone, and to no intermediate laws, “is the core
of political absolutism or tyranny.”151 I have argued that at every point the
exercise of the judicial function should be, as I have put it, porous to prepositive law sources, but I have stressed that the question of “how porous”
is not to be answered by consulting a Platonic Form. But how, then, are
the metes and bounds of the judicial office to be determined? A complete
answer to this question would require more space than I have available
here, but a suggestive, skeletal answer will serve to draw the threads of my
argument together. The answer lies in the people’s duty of selfgovernance.

regarding rights. The Court’s recent, more self-conscious attention to tradition has
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One of the recurrent missteps in the contemporary jurisprudential
battle between liberals and conservatives about the judicial function is
bald assertion—from both sides, though with different content—about
what judges can and cannot properly do. It is the baldness of the
assertions that is the principal trouble. To take a leading example, Ronald
Dworkin has famously developed a theory of an ambitious judicial role,
but he has done so without apparent regard for the possible difference
between the federal judicial role, on the one hand, and the respective
judicial roles of the fifty states, on the other.152 These roles have been
created by different bodies politic, at different times, and, at least
potentially, for different purposes. The created roles may in fact turn out
to be the same, but determining what the respective roles are would be, I
maintain, a matter of determining what the people who set up those
various governments in fact did.
I maintain that this is the question – what the people have in fact
done – because, as nearly everyone in our culture believes, the people are
possessed of a right to engage in self-government. Discharging their right
to govern themselves, the people create structures of governance that
necessarily include offices. What the metes and bounds of those offices
are, is a question of what the people decided. As Paul Bator has
explained, “The judicial power is neither a Platonic essence nor a preexisting legal classification. It is a purposive institutional concept, whose
content is a product of history and custom distilled in the light of
experience and expediency.”153 The question presented, in figuring out
what given judges can and cannot do (as a matter of constitutional law), is
the question of how wise and smart the framers have in fact been. Not all
framers or groups of framers are created equal, but it would be a
usurpation of the people’s common right for individual judges or courts to
take more (or less) than the people had allotted to them.154
This is one part of the equation, what follows from the people’s
right to govern themselves. The other part, which is the part that is more
readily overlooked, is ontologically prior: the people’s undoubted right to
govern themselves derives from—and is therefore governed by—the
natural law. The right to self-government is not an exception to the
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derivative status of natural rights vis-à-vis the natural law. It is because
the people are under a duty to obey the natural law that they are both
required to and competent to set up government: required, because the
duty to live by the natural law is not delegable, and the natural law itself
does not include all the legal content, let alone the enforcement
mechanisms, that are necessary to successful human living; competent,
because the natural law gives them a standard of judgment that assures the
possibility that their governance can avoid arbitrariness by being legal.155
I should elaborate this last point, about avoiding arbitrariness by
being legal, because it really is the heart of the matter. On the natural law
account that I sketched above, every human being is possessed of a real
law—the natural law—according to which he can reach legal judgments.
Moral judgments, whether by individuals in private capacities or by
individuals in public office, have the potential—the exigence—to be in
accord with law. By returning to the insight that morality itself is legal,
that the natural law is real law, we will be saved from the worry that
judicial introduction of morality into law is inevitably a legally
ungoverned enterprise.156 Equipped with a real law according to which
they can reach judgments, the people need not be the victims of official
arbitrariness or institutionalized self-definition; they can and should call
for rule according to the natural law. And, one might add, if they are
forced to live under a regime that is characterized by arbitrariness, “law”
that represents a gross or systematic deviation from the natural law, they
will possess, under that same natural law, a legal, ontologically rooted
ground of resistance, perhaps even revolution.157
Prescinding from the situation of revolution, different peoples and
their respective cultures will reach different decisions about how to make
the natural law effective in their living, and, as I have already argued, the
first question for a sitting judge will be what decisions the people, in
setting up (or later amending, in the required way) their government, made
regarding the judicial office. To the extent that the people left the judicial
way open to the natural law, then it will be a question of discretion or
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prudence on the part of the judge or court. But, drawing upon the
argument of the early part of this Article, I want to make a further point,
which goes to why, in general, it will be wise for people to set up judicial
offices that, at least to some extent, allow judges “directly to speak the
natural law.”158
By “directly to speak the natural law,” I mean exactly that judges
should be allowed to make law (in accordance with the natural law and in
the way delimited by relevant positive law), and the principal reason is
that, at least ordinarily, judges will be in a better position to engage in the
dialectical argument by which the natural law can be discovered and
implemented. Of course, at the level of human biological potential and
limit, legislatures and the legislators that constitute them are in the same
epistemic boat as judges are in: the leaky vessel that is practical reason.
No more than a seat on the bus does a seat on the bench give the seated
one special access to moral truth. But there are better and worse
conditions in which to use and develop practical reason, and the typical
judicial circumstances fall on the better end of the spectrum.
The reason for this is complex, but the core of it as follows: in our
legal culture, judges, unlike legislators and legislatures, are required to
give reasons. It is true that legislators often give explanations for what
they are up to in proposing or supporting legislation, but there is little by
way of culture that demands that their reasons be argued rather than
asserted. Legislators can often get by with progandistic, half-hearted
explanations for their decisions. As Vining observed, legislation is “the
arbitrary that we allow – but limit.”159 Judges have the last word, and, in
our legal system, they must ordinarily give words and arguments in favor
of that last word. All of which underlines the point that judges’ words—
their reasons—must be given both honestly and out of respect for the
judicial office and tradition of this culture.160 Sometimes judges fall short,
and sometimes they are criticized for their failures.161 Glucksberg worried
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that judicial “‘guideposts for responsible decisionmaking . . . are scarce
and openended’”162 in the context of unenumerated rights. But this would
be true only in the abstract. Tradition offers the starting points of many
and sometimes competing arguments from which to add a layer of
intelligence.163 If this sounds banal, it’s the banal that we are or can hope
to be.
CONCLUSION
To the conservative worry that the risk of judicial manipulation of
the natural rights inquiry is sufficient reason to deny legal appeals to the
natural law in the judicial process, I reply that that such a denial will
inevitably eventuate in a barrier to the basic project of making the natural
law effective in our human living.164 No written instrument can be
complete or exhaustive of the scope of the natural law that we come to
know only incrementally. Nor is it enough to say that the people can
amend the Constitution. As Aquinas notes, the act of judgment is “like a
particular law regarding some particular fact,”165 and, consistent with the
concomitant demands for predictability, stability, accountability, and nonusurpation, judgment should be as right as our reasoning powers will
allow. Again, “law is evidence of belief far stronger than academic
statement and introspection can provide,” and what it reveals is that,
though it has been a question of degree and kind, there has never been a
time when American constitutional decision-making has been immune to
the claims of natural law and natural rights. In the words of the first
Justice Harlan:

unmeaning way can likewise not be attended to, for he is not present as a mind or person.
This means that his opinion cannot be read with the care and attention lawyers are trained
to give authoritative texts in the law; it means, too, that he in a real way cannot be
responsible for what he is doing. This kind of writing, to use the distinction made
prominent by my colleague Joseph Vining, is authoritarian, not authoritative. It is part of
what Simone Weil would call the empire of force.”).
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[T]he courts have rarely, if ever, felt themselves so
restrained by technical rules that they could not find some
remedy, consistent with the law, for acts, whether done by
government or by individual persons, that violated natural
justice or were hostile to the fundamental principles
devised for the protection of the essential rights of
property.166
Evidence of what we do in law is evidence far more probative than what
we say in law. And with respect to what we do in law, it remains always a
question of degree, and perilously.
As H.L.A. Hart observed some years back, no legal system could
long survive if it did not give effect to at least a minimum of the natural
law.167 Hart himself was in favor of making a strong and clear distinction
between positive law and the natural law (or morality), and, as I have
stressed, the virtue of not collapsing the distinction between positive law
and morality is that the conceptual clarity about what morality demands in
turn allows one a critical perspective on the positive law.168 No
functioning legal system is perfect, but a legal system that is not calibrated
to introduce natural law and rights into human living, as circumstances
allow or require, is unworthy of creatures who are under the natural law.
This is just the hitch, however—the widespread and expanding
belief that we have liberated ourselves from the natural law, the source of
our natural rights. The natural rights content of our laws is leaking or,
rather, being squeezed out. And this is why I have insisted that a recovery
of the tradition of natural law and natural rights discourse must insist upon
the claim that the natural law is true, divine law – not just one moral
theory among many others on a menu from which a selection can be made
at will. Brian Tamanaha has worried at length that law as we practice it
has become a means to an end, a mere tool for bringing to pass people’s
transitory preferences.169 But what Tamanaha seems not to see is that
what alone can save this from happening is the possibility, as described in
this Article, that the creation of positive law is the mandated extension and
implementation of higher law: It can be law all the way down, because
it’s law all the way up. Formalism, along with the other allegedly non-
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instrumentalist possibilities that Tamanaha explores, is itself an “empty
vessel” that lacks the legal backbone that can arrest the instrumentalist
slide in its tracks.170
But if, as I have argued, the solution is a recovery of the traditional
understanding of the natural law, the question must be faced: Does one
have to believe in God to know the contents of the natural law? Aquinas
thought not; as he saw things, we humans need only know what is good
for us. Understanding that the natural law is about what is good for us, not
merely a legalistic intrusion or a ghostly code of commands, is the key:
We have privileged access to ourselves and to what reflection upon
experience shows to be good for us and those like us.
Aquinas also thought that it was a matter of simple inference that
God legislates that we must do what is good for us, but few today are
prepared to make the inference that Aquinas thought was easy.171 Are we
therefore stuck in Smith’s quandary? Do we, as Justice Scalia suggests,
need to postulate—or perhaps even believe in—God if we are to have a
legal system that is porous with respect to the contents of the natural law?
What I have tried to suggest is that if we are still capable of
reasoning as our forebears did about what is good for us, then the answer
is no. But that is a big if.172 The contemporary scene is long on rights,
thin on goods.173 As a result, belief in a God who orders us to seek and to
do what is good just might turn out to be, if you will, the incentive we
need in order to stop pretending that we are infinitely pliable, selfnorming, self-definers,174 whose lives can be “define[d]” without
170
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authority’s making moral judgments. Belief in God can be hard work, and
so is self-definition, at least as “difficult as what was required of the homo
oeconomicus of the nineteenth century to lay transcontinental
railroads.”175 But is it not easier to believe that there exists a God who
made friends, play, Biber’s Missa Salisburgensis, puppies, sunrises,
willing sacrifice, love, lovers, procreation, and every other good thing
possible in the first place, than it is to believe that there exists, as a
freestanding feature of the furniture of the universe, a right to use sex
toys?176 Either way, God help us.177
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